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Abstract. Machine Learning (ML) has the potential to become widesp-
read in safety-critical applications. It is therefore important that we have
sufficient confidence in the safe behaviour of the ML-based functionality.
One key consideration is whether the ML being used is interpretable. In
this paper, we present an argument pattern, i.e. reusable structure, that
can be used for justifying the sufficient interpretability of ML within a
wider assurance case. The pattern can be used to assess whether the
right interpretability method and format are used in the right context
(time, setting and audience). This argument structure provides a basis
for developing and assessing focused requirements for the interpretability
of ML in safety-critical domains.
Keywords: Interpretability · Explainability · Machine Learning · Arti-
ficial Intelligence · Assurance · Safety · Safety-Case
1 Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are powerful tools and have applications in
domains in which safety is a concern. One potential weakness of these algo-
rithms is that they are often too complicated to understand - they may relate
thousands of variables into patterns which cannot be understood by a human.
This property is often referred to as the black-box problem. How can we accept
these algorithms into safety-critical decision-making roles if we cannot under-
stand how their decisions are made? [5,13] This problem has limited the growth
of ML algorithms in areas such as healthcare [20, 31].
A solution to this issue is to use ML algorithms which are more interpretable,
or to try to explain their behaviour. In some sense an algorithm is interpretable
if we can understand how it works and/or why it makes the decisions that it does
make. [8] defines interpretability in the context of ML as ‘the ability to explain or
to present in understandable terms to a human’ but notes that what constitutes
an explanation is not well-defined. In practice, the term interpretability is used
to refer to a number of distinct concepts [21]. A ML model may be said to be
interpretable if the algorithm is simple enough for us to understand, otherwise
there may be some post-hoc methods which can be used to interpret a black-box.
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From a safety perspective, interpretability may help us to (1) understand
the system retrospectively, i.e. to understand, with respect to a harm-causing
action or decision, what went wrong, and why and (2) understand the system
prospectively, i.e. to predict, mitigate, and prevent future harm-causing actions
or decisions. But to what extent does machine learning need to be interpretable
to provide assurance? To answer this question, we must decide on who needs to
understand the system, what they need to understand, what types of interpre-
tations are appropriate, and when do these interpretations need to be provided.
To this end, we present an argument pattern, i.e. reusable structure, that
can be used for justifying the sufficient interpretability of ML within a wider
assurance case. Structured argumentation is well-established in the safety-critical
domain as a means for communicating, justifying and assessing confidence in
properties of interest (e.g. risk reduction and acceptability). The pattern presents
an explicit argument that can be used to assess whether the right interpretability
method and format are used in the right context (time, setting and audience).
We show how our pattern can be instantiated for assuring the interpretability
of a system of neural networks intended for retinal disease diagnosis.
The following section provides a background to ML interpretability. In Sec-
tion 3 we present an argument pattern for assuring that ML systems are inter-
pretable. Then in Section 4 we motivate the need for interpretability in safety-
critical ML systems.
2 A Brief Overview of Interpretability
There is a wealth of literature on interpretability of ML and AI [21], covering
a wide range of philosophical and psychological perspectives [1, 12, 23, 26]; the
legal implications of (un)interpretable ML [4, 11, 30]; technical methods for in-
terpreting different types of ML models [3, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 27, 28]; and further
discussions which try to bring some clarity to the field [7, 20, 21,29].
Lipton in [21] seeks to clarify the myriad different notions of interpretability
of ML models in the literature - what interpretability means and why it is
important. It is noted that interpretability is not a monolithic concept and relates
to distinct ideas. The distinction is often made between methods which are
intrinsically transparent and post-hoc methods that attempt to explain a model.
We identify the following types of interpretability. A model/system is:
– Transparent if we understand how it genuinely works (mechanistically,
at some level, for some part of the process). A transparent model is one
which is inherently simple enough for humans to understand. For example,
for a learned model, could a human take the inputs and generate the same
outputs as the model (in reasonable time)?
– Explainable if we can understand why it makes the decisions that it does
make by using some post-hoc analysis and/or approximation, covering:
• Global explainability techniques which approximate the model with
a simpler more transparent one. This simple approximate model is an
explanation.
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• Local explainability techniques which map inputs to outputs and iden-
tify important inputs. These help us to answer the question ‘what were
the important factors in this decision?’
We can categorize some of the features of these different types of interpretabil-
ity. Transparency provides faithful representations of the model, whereas ex-
plainable methods are often approximations, or incomplete explanations. Hence,
there is a spectrum which captures the level of fidelity of different types of in-
terpretability. Some methods interpret the whole model (global) whereas some
interpret individual decisions (local). Transparency can be seen as an intrinsic
property of a model (it is either easy to understand or not, or some degree in
between), whereas explainability techniques are post-hoc methods which require
some extra effort to implement.
It may be impossible for some systems/models to be fully and completely
interpretable. For instance, a neural network may have some local explainability
in that we can map certain inputs to outputs. But this does not provide a
complete picture of how the model works globally and it is not transparent. We
are interested in sufficient levels of interpretability needed to assure safety in
different contexts.
3 An Argument Structure for the Interpretability of ML
Table 1: Phased Safety-Argument Development Alongside ML Life-cycle
Safety-Argument Phase ML Life-cycle Stage Interpretability Needs
Preliminary Data Management Global/Local: Identify
Weaknesses in Data
Interim 1 Model Learning Global: Aid Model
Design
Interim 2 Model Verification Global/Local: Identify
Weaknesses in Model
Operational Model Deployment Local: Understand
Decisions
Safety arguments, or “safety cases”, are a well-established method used to as-
sure system properties in the field of safety engineering. [16] advocates a phased
safety argument approach wherein a number of safety case versions are issued
alongside the developing technology, enabling an evolving safety argument. This
phased safety argument will inform, and be informed by, the development pro-
cess. This can be combined with the ML life-cycle from [2], which discusses the
assurance of the complex, iterative process starting with the collection of data
used to train an ML model, and ending with the deployment of that model. A
safety argument should evolve with the ML life-cycle, as in Table 1. Because
of the cyclical nature of the ML life-cycle, interpretability at a later stage may
bring to light flaws which can then be accounted for on the next iteration.
In Figure 2, we define an argument pattern that explicitly addresses the in-
terpretability assurance considerations, i.e. primary claims, argument strategies
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and evidence. The argument is represented using the pattern language of the
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [16]. GSN is a graphical argumentation no-
tation which explicitly represents the individual elements of a safety argument
(claims, evidence, and context) and the relationships that exist between these
elements. When the elements of GSN are linked together in a network they
are described as a “goal structure”. We draw heavily from [6] which presents a
pattern for arguing the assurance of machine learning, with a focus on clinical
diagnosis. The first step is to ask why the project needs interpretability and
set the desired requirements that the project should satisfy (e.g. being able to
investigate accidents see Section 4.1). Figure 1 shows a key for GSN.
Supported by
In context of
Goal 
Claim 
Statement
Context
Context 
Statement
Strategy
Argument that goal is 
met
Solution
Evidence
Reference
To be 
Instantiated
Developed
Fig. 1. GSN Key
– Goal - these are the claims being made in the argument.
– Context - the relevant additional information to the argument.
– Strategy - the argument approach for the support of a claim.
– Solution - evidence reference that claims have been met.
– Supported by - (solid arrows) indicates inferential/evidential relationships.
– In context of - (hollow arrows) declares contextual relationships.
– To be instantiated attached to an element indicates that some part of
the element’s content is a variable that requires instantiation. Variables are
declared using curled braces, such as {ML Model}.
3.1 Interpretability Claim
In Figure 2, the starting point is the claim that the ML Model is sufficiently
interpretable in the intended context. ‘ML model’, ‘interpretable’, and ‘context’
are variables in this claim to be instantiated As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the term ‘interpretable’ may refer to different types of interpretability. The
substantiation of the ‘ML model’ will be the actual ML model being used, or a
component of it, or the system as a whole - whatever needs to be interpreted.
The context refers to the setting, time, and audience of the interpretation.
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3.2 High Level Argument
We identify three essential aspects of the interpretability argument, building on
past work on context-aware systems [10]:
– Right Method - The right interpretability methods are implemented, i.e. the
correct information is faithfully being explained.
– Right Context:
• Time - Interpretations produced at the appropriate times.
• Setting - Interpretations are available in the right setting.
• Audience - Interpretations produced for the right audience.
– Right Format - The interpretability methods are presented in the right for-
mat for the audience.
A detailed argument over these essential aspects is presented in the next
subsections.
3.3 Argument Over Interpretability Methods
This is the argument that suitable interpretability methods have been imple-
mented, a method may simply be choosing a transparent model, or employing
some post-hoc explainability techniques. There are two parts to this argument,
first that the methods provide the type of interpretability required to satisfy the
high level interpretability claim (e.g. if the claim is that the ML model is locally
explainable in the context of accidents then the methods must provide this local
explainability). Secondly the interpretability methods must be suitably faithful
to the model process; these methods may be approximations to the model and
may therefore not be accurate interpretations in all cases [29]. The interpretabil-
ity methods must satisfy some desired level of fidelity in the given context. Both
of these being satisfied equates to the correct information being explained.
Once a set of interpretability methods has been proposed, evidence that these
methods are sufficient for purpose must be gathered. There are at least three
different things which must be evaluated with regard to interpretability: how
satisfying and appropriate produced interpretations are to stakeholders; how
faithful interpretations are to the actual model workings; and the relevance of
the interpretation being given. There is some initial research on how to evaluate
the interpretability of ML models. [25] outlines how levels of explainability can
be measured with respect to different user groups. [8] proposes an evidence-
based taxonomy of evaluation approaches for interpretability. These are ways in
which interpretations can be evaluated with respect to how effective they are
at convincing users. Whilst it is important that stakeholders are satisfied with
interpretations, these interpretations also need to be an accurate depiction of
how the system acctually works.
Especially in safety-critical systems, it is important that interpretations, or
explanations, of how a system works are not only convincing and satisfying
but also reliably a faithful account of how the model is actually working. [28]
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presents a technical method for evaluating the faithfulness of a certain kind of
local explanation technique. These types of evaluation help users to understand
how a model is genuinely working, even so far as the explanations can help users
to gain enough insight to improve the model. [19] evaluates fidelity (faithfulness
to the model) of explanations vs interpretability (how easy it is to understand)
finding there are trade-offs between the two.
Recent work has highlighted the capacity of even high-fidelity explanations
to mislead users [18]. Three key issues with current post-hoc methods, when
optimised for fidelity, are described: i) they do not capture causal relationships;
ii) they cannot choose between multiple (qualitatively different) high-fidelity ex-
planations; iii) they can vary significantly with small perturbations of the input
data. These problems lead to the possibility that current explainability tech-
niques can actually mislead users. Importantly, explanations must also provide
the most relevant information.
3.4 Argument Over Context
For simplicity we split context into time, setting, and audience.
– Right Time: Interpretations must be provided at the right time to avoid
being intrusive or confusing. Not every decision may need to be explained
and some interpretations may be needed in real time whereas others may
only need to be produced under specific circumstances. For example, a diag-
nostic system may need to provide local explanations to clinicians alongside
every diagnosis prediction, whereas an autonomous vehicle may only need
to provide an explanation when an incident has occurred.
– Right Setting: It is important that interpretations are usefully available
to the audience in the correct setting. Consider again a diagnostic tool,
interpretations must be available to doctors in the clinical setting alongside
diagnosis predictions. It is not useful for engineers to be able to produce
interpretations if the audience do not have access to them in the relevant
setting.
– Right Audience: Interpretations must clearly be provided to the right
people to satisfy the interpretability claim and to satisfy the motivations for
interpretability, e.g. policy makers vs developers vs users .
3.5 Argument Over the Format of Interpretations
The format of the interpretations is key. Once suitable methods for interpret-
ing the system have been chosen, they must be presented in a format which
is comprehensible and relevant to the audience. Section 3.3 discusses how to
evaluate the extent to which interpretations are appropriate and satisfying to
stakeholders and Section 4.4 outlines the needs of different stakeholders.
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3.6 Example: Deep Learning for Diagnosis in Retinal Disease
We now examine a paper by DeepMind [9] that presents a system of two Neural
Networks (NNs) working to predict retinal disease from scans of the eye. The pa-
per purports to address the “black-box problem” by producing a midpoint result
in the system. The first model takes as input a scan of the retina and produces
a tissue-segmentation map. The second neural network takes the segmentation
map and outputs a diagnosis and referral (with confidence levels). This process
supplies some system-level transparency. We can instantiate this example in our
argument structure as follows (Figure 3):
Interpretability Claim: The desired type of interpretability is transparency at
the level of the system logic, the system being the combination of the two NNs.
The context is defined by: the setting - the retinal diagnosis pathway; the time
that interpretations are produced - alongside the system diagnosis prediction;
the audience - the retinal clinicians.
Argument Over Method: The method by which interpretability is produced
is that the system structure, including the production of the segmentation map,
closely resembles the normal decision-process used by clinicians. This means that
the system logic is inherently comprehensible, i.e. transparent, to the retinal
clinicians. Note that this is true even though the individual NNs being used
are not interpreted in any way. This is clearly a faithful method of interpreting
the system logic, as transparency of the system is by definition faithful (the
interpretation of the system logic is the system logic itself).
Argument Over Context: The audience are the retinal clinicians, and they
need interpretations of system behaviour in the clinical setting and alongside
each system diagnosis prediction.
Argument Over Format: The format of the interpretation is the transparent
system logic, including the segmentation map. Presumably, the same prediction
accuracy results could have been achieved without including the mid-point out-
put of the segmentation map. Including this step allows clinicians to understand
the system logic, since the production and use of the segmentation map are part
of the normal clinical process and are understood by the retinal clinicians.
In summary, the healthcare setting here is clearly safety-critical and the de-
signers of this system have identified interpretability as a requirement of the
system in order that clinicians are able to understand and verify the system’s
predictions. Even though the individual NNs used were not interpreted, the
method still provided some transparency of the system logic to the retinal clin-
icians, increasing their understanding of, and trust in, the ML system.
4 Discussion: Key Safety Interpretability Questions
4.1 Why Do We Need Interpretability in Safety-Critical Domains?
There are many reasons why we should want our ML systems to be interpretable.
Interpretability may:
– Increase insight into model behaviour (and into the operational domain).
T
itle
S
u
p
p
ressed
D
u
e
to
E
x
cessiv
e
L
en
g
th
9
Interpretability Claim
The ML system is sufficiently interpretable in the 
intended context
Dual NN system
Argument based on the essential 
aspects of interpretability
Essential aspects of 
interpretability: method, 
context & format
Right Format
The format of the interpretation is the 
transparent system logic, including the 
segmentation map
Right Method
The system structure and segmentation 
map provide transparency of the system 
logic and allow clinicians to understand 
decisions
Right  Context
Segmentation map produced 
in the retinal diagnosis 
pathway
Interpretability method is 
suitably faithful to the system 
process
Argument over interpretability 
methods The system structure, including 
production of the segmentation map, 
closely resembles the normal clinical 
decision-making process & offers 
comprehensible insight into system 
logic
The system structure closely 
resembles the normal 
decision-process taken by 
clinicians (first producing the 
segmentation map then the 
diagnosis)
Clinicians need an 
explanation alongside every 
diagnoses prediction
The interpretability method is 
the comprehensible structure of 
the system and the production 
of the segmentation map
Interpretability method is right 
type (the correct thing is being 
explained).
Clearly clinicians need to be 
able to access these 
explanations within the 
clinical setting
Segmentation 
map
Interpretable = 
transparency of 
system logic
Context: setting - retinal 
diagnosis pathway; time - 
alongside diagnosis 
predictions; audience - retinal 
clinicians}
Right Time 
Segmentation map is 
produced alongside diagnosis 
prediction
Right Setting
Explanations are available in 
the clinical setting
System structure 
and segmentation 
map
Right Audience
Explanations produced for 
the retinal clinicians
The clinicians need an 
explanation to understand  
and trust system predictions
Fig. 3. DeepMind Example
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– Identify weaknesses of the model, cases where the model under-performs.
– Enable the increase of robustness - i.e. assurance that the system will
behave as intended in new environments/situations.
– Inform effective improvements/corrections.
– Protect against unfair models helping to avoid discrimination.
– Improve trust in the model and allow informed consent [31]
These advantages are beneficial in any domain of ML use. With regards to
safety, interpretability is of interest for two key reasons:
– To understand the system retrospectively: to understand, with respect to
a harm-causing action or decision, what went wrong, and why. This is im-
portant for post-hoc system diagnostics, establishing accountability, and
accident inquiries.
– To understand the system prospectively: to predict, mitigate, and prevent
future harm-causing actions or decisions.
Furthermore, the right to an intelligible explanation is supposedly required
by law under the well-known 2018 GDPR regulation [11]. However, [24] argues
that a right to explanation of automated decision-making does not exist in the
GDPR due to the fact that the GDPR lacks precise language as well as explicit
and well-defined rights and safeguards against automated decision-making. This
closely relates to the lack of a precise language in the technical field of ML
interpretbility [21].
4.2 What Needs to be Interpreted?
The different types of interpretability identified in Section 2 result in the inter-
pretation of a set of distinct objects or processes. Transparency may refer to: the
transparency of the whole model, wherein the entire global logic of the model
can be explained and understood by a human; the transparency of the learn-
ing algorithm, we may understand that some algorithms converge to a solution
in reasonable time (e.g. linear models), whereas we may not know whether an-
other algorithm finds an optima at all (e.g. neural networks) [21]; transparency
of parameters and model structures, do we understand what these are referring
to and do they even map to human-understandable concepts? Similarly post-
hoc explainablity methods may try to explain and interpret these processes, e.g.
through approximating the global logic of a model, or they may explain local
decisions. Global interpretability methods generate evidence that applies to a
whole model (or system), and can be used to support safety assurance by al-
lowing reasoning about all possible future outcomes. Local methods generate
explanations for an individual system decision, and may be used to 1) predict
how the system will behave in specific situations and 2) analyse why a particular
problem occurred, and to improve the model so future events of this type are
avoided.
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4.3 When are Interpretations Needed?
Interpretations will be needed for different reasons during development and op-
eration (Figure 4). ML developers may seek global explanations to better un-
derstand the model to aid design; stakeholders will need different types of inter-
pretations during operation (local explanations may be more important during
operation to explain individual cases - e.g. when explaining why an accident
occurred). During development interpretations will be needed for:
– Data Management - interpreting the model may identify imbalances/gaps
in the data.
– Model Selection - the interpretability of a model should influence this.
– Model Learning - being able to interpret the model will inform the model
learning stage, e.g. in aiding hyper-parameter selection, data augmentation,
etc.
– Model Verification - being able to interpret model decisions will aid veri-
fication and help to identify the cause of model weaknesses.
And during operation:
– Normal operation - e.g. for advisory systems such as diagnostic tools
explanations may be compulsory.
– In cases where the model is known to underperform - which will aid
contestability or identifying when to hand over control to a human.
– Accident or incident Investigation - Local explainability (e.g. counter-
factual) to discover why particular decisions were made.
– Model Run-time Improvement/Learning - To improve models as new
data and situations are encountered.
4.4 Who Needs an Interpretation?
Different stakeholders need different types of interpretations, consider lay users,
expert users, designers, etc. Developers need explanations and transparency to
understand how the model works in order to predict when undesirable model
behaviour will occur and make corrections and improvements. Whilst developers
may need some local explainability to understand and account for edge cases, in
general they will need global interpretability to aid design. End-users will need
local explanations to satisfy understanding of individual decisions. Figure 4 lists
some potential stakeholders and the explanation needs for each.
5 Summary
In this paper, we built on previous work, which developed an assurance argument
pattern for reasoning about ML in safety-critical domains. We extended this
argument pattern by identifying interpretability as a key consideration. The
extended argument pattern can be used to guide developers of ML systems as
12 Francis Rhys Ward  and Ibrahim Habli
Fig. 4. Interpretation needs for different stakeholders
part of a wider safety or assurance case. It identifies how to create a structured
assurance argument for the interpretability of ML models to support a decision
over the deployment of the models in safety-critical applications. The key points
in the argument are the essential aspects: right method, right context, and right
format. These are claims that we have identified as necessary to form an explicit
argument over interpretability; importantly these claims must also be supported
by appropriate evidence.
The focus of future work should be to evaluate the applicability of the argu-
ment structure which should be presented to ML practitioners, their feedback
should be used to make any necessary improvements. Further work may expand
our argument structure to address different cases, for instance by drawing a more
concrete link between relevant assurance properties and clear interpretability
needs in a particular system. We hope that this argument structure will provide
a clear basis for developing and assessing requirements for the interpretability
of ML in safety-critical domains.
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